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1. The central banks are pressed by politicians to promote a looser monetary policy before 
elections, in order to ensure, on the short-run, a more dynamic output growth. 
 
2. The influence of electoral cycles on the monetary policy is less observed in OECD then in 
CEE countries, due to a higher degree of independence enjoyed by the first ones. 
 
3. In countries where the election induced monetary policy is statistically significant, the 
monetary policy transmission is slower.  
According to the political business cycle theory, the political incumbents wishing to be 
reelected for the next term, exercise significant pressures on the monetary authorities in 
order to decrease as much as possible the unemployment and to foster the output growth 
before elections. This is done by engineering some inflation, which spurs the nominal 
incomes of the voters. If this is the case, the assumption of central bank independence 
employed in most of monetary policy analysis is irrelevant. Therefore, in this master thesis I 
will test for significance the impact of electoral cycles on the monetary policy among several 
CEE and OECD countries. In this way, I will perform a comparative analysis between two 
groups of developed and developing countries, with different institutional experience and 
overall economic development. The implication of such kind of comparative analysis is quite 
important for public policies, because it reveals the institutional deficiencies linked with the 
central banks’ independence. Respectively, it can explain to a certain extend the reasons 
why the transmission of monetary policy is slower in countries were the monetary authorities 
are most vulnerable to political pressures. The main data sources will be OECD statistical 
database, websites of analyzed central banks, national bureaus of statistics of analyzed 
countries and several portals gathering data about elections: electionresources.org, 
electionguide.org, alegeri.md.  
The Impact of Political Cycles on Monetary Policies in CEE and OECD and its Effects on 
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1. Estimating The Impact of Electoral Cycles on Monetary Policies? 
 a. Theories Behind Election Induced Monetary Policies 
 b. The Data Description 
 c. The Models Description 
 
2. Do the Central Banks in Developed Countries Enjoy More Political Independence then in 
Developing Ones? 
 a. Empirical Results Interpretation 
 b. Decifering the differences between OECD and CEE countries 
 c. Discussion about the Main Determinants of Political Independence of Central 
Banks 
 
3. The Importance of Central Banks’ independence for Monetary Policy Transmission  
 a. Theories Behind Monetary Policy Transmission 
 b. Descriprion of the data 
 c. VAR Model Description 
 d. Discussion of the Results 
In order to estimate the impact of electoral cycles of monetary policies I will use 2 
econometric approaches for double checking. The first one is the threshold non-linear OLS 
model which allows for controlling the asymmetric behavior of the central bank in response 
to inflationary under- and overshooting (Taylor and Davradakis, 2006). Thus, I will estimate 
a non-linear Taylor rule with an incorporated electoral variable, while the central bank is 
supposed to run 2 regimes: 1. Inflationary overshooting regime - it is expected to tackle the 
inflationary pressures more aggressively, particularly by increasing its policy rate; 2. 
Inflationary undershooting regime - it is expected to promote a more accommodative 
monetary policy. Correspondingly, if the electoral variable proves statistically significant, we 
can conclude about electorally induced monetary policy. The second econometric approach 
is state space modeling which will be used in order to measure the time-varying responses 
of the central bank to inflation and for graphical illustration of electoral shocks on monetary 
policy stance (Baxa, Horvath and Vasicek, 2010; Harvey, 1989; Hamilton, 1994). Finally, the 
monetary policy transmission analysis will be performed using the VAR models, which are 
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The thesis provides a comparative estimation of the electoral cycles’ influence on the 
monetary policies among a group of developed and developing countries. We use a non-
linear central bank’s reaction function which captures the regime switching behavior of 
the monetary authority depending on the proximity of elections. Moreover, we compare 
the reaction function with partial adjustment, which controls for policy inertia, with a 
non-inertial policy rule with serially correlated errors which takes into account other 
shocks determining the central bank to deviate from its policy rule. The estimation was 
performed via OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS, the preference being given to the last one due to 
correction of endogeneity problem and efficiency gains. Robust evidence about election 
induced monetary policies was found in 2 out of 10 developed economies and 4 out of 
10 developing economies. In these countries, the central banks tend to be less inflation 
averse and/or less counter-cyclical (or even pro-cyclical) during electoral periods in 
comparison with normal times. Additionally, we find that the legislative framework, in 
these countries, incorporates significant deviations from the best practices of central 
bank independence. Finally, following the dynamic inconsistency problem, we 
document a strong inflationary bias in the economies with politically sensitive monetary 
policies. It confirms the imperative importance of central bank’s reputation, insulation 
of monetary policy from the fiscal one and the necessity of an adequate legislative 
design to ensure the full independence of the monetary authority. 
 
Keywords 
Monetary Policy, Central Bank Reaction Function, Political Monetary Cycles, Dynamic 
Inconsistency Problem, Inflation Bias, OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS.  











”As goes politics, so goes economic policy and 
performance. This is the case because, as goes economic 
performance, so goes election”  
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Introduction 
The year 1989 marked a turning point for a new era in central banking: the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand adopted a new Act which made this country the first to embark 
upon inflation targeting. Respectively, it was accompanied with ensuring a better 
insulation of the monetary policy from the fiscal one. Soon, it was followed by other 
countries all over the world which started in depth reforms aimed at increasing the 
operational and political independence of the central banks (Cukierman, 1992). What 
was the main driving force which shifted the mainstream among researcher and policy 
circles? The catapulting inflation of ’70 and ’80 and the failure of central banks to keep 
the prices stable uncovered the problem of time inconsistency and optimal commitment 
policies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The main explanation lied in the perverse 
incentives of incumbent politicians who had enough tools to exercise pressures on the 
monetary authorities in order to boost on the short-run the economy above its potential 
level, in order to create more jobs and buy more votes before elections. Under such 
political constraints, the central banks proved to be unable to keep prices low and stable.  
Despite the broad consensus on the importance of clear separation of the monetary 
policy from fiscal one and its insulation from electoral cycles and political 
manipulations, the recent sovereign debt crisis posed new challenges to the central 
banks’ independence. Particularly, it owes to unconventional monetary policies 
implemented in many countries, through which the central banks all over the world, 
including FED and ECB, resorted to money creation by purchasing large amounts of 
sovereign debt. In this way, the separation of monetary policy from the fiscal one was 
blurred, while the inflationary risks significantly increased. In light of these new trends, 
the issue of central banks’ independence became again a heated topic of discussion 
among researchers, policy makers and media.   
How and why the politicians are motivated to tilt the monetary policy into their interest? 
According to the political business cycle theory (Nordhaus, 1975), the political 
incumbents wishing to be reelected for the next term, exercise significant pressures on 
the monetary authorities in order to decrease as much as possible the unemployment and 
foster the output growth before elections. Therefore, the central banks are persuaded to 
implement a monetary expansion in the electoral periods in order to boost the aggregate 
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demand. In this way the opportunistic politicians use the monetary policy as a tool to 
exploit the Phillips curve (short-run trade between inflation and unemployment) to buy 
votes from the myopic electorate who heavily discount the future.  
Most of the central banks around the world are - or at least – pretend – to be politically 
and financially independent institutions. This is stipulated either in a normative law or 
the Constitution, which act in accordance with an ex ante set objective(s). Therefore, the 
central bank independence is a commonly used assumption employed in the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis related to monetary policy. According to it, the central bank 
follows firmly its social loss minimization function by steering the price level and 
inflationary expectations and promoting a counter-cyclical policy with respect to output 
level.  
Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the monetary authorities in most countries 
are public institutions, the Governors are usually appointed by the legislative power, in 
some cases the central bank’s objective is defined by the Government and, especially in 
developing countries, the board members have close ties with the incumbent political 
party or coalition. Given the desire of the ruling party to get reelected for the next term, 
we can suspect a politically induced monetary policy influenced by electoral cycles, 
which is an important topic for empirical research.  
In this paper we test for significance of the impact of electoral cycles on the monetary 
policies. Particularly, we perform a comparative analysis between two groups of 
developed and developing countries, with different institutional experience and 
economic development. The implication of such kind of comparative analysis is quite 
important for public policies, because it reveals the institutional deficiencies linked with 
the central banks’ independence. Respectively, it can explain to a certain extend the 
reasons why the transmission of monetary policy is slower in countries were the 
monetary authorities are most vulnerable to political pressures. Thus, based on the 
results from our estimation of electoral induced monetary policies, we analyze the main 
explanatory factors which make the central banks vulnerable to political pressures, as 
well as the outcomes of these Political Monetary Cycles (PMC).  
Unlike most of the papers which assume a linear and static central bank reaction 
function, the analysis is performed using a regime switching non-linear estimation of 
the monetary policy Taylor rule. It allows for comparing the estimated coefficients in 
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two regimes: (i) the electoral one (4 quarters before the election’s day) and (ii) the non-
electoral one (the rest of the period). Therefore, the evidence of electoral influence on 
monetary policy will be confirmed in cases where the coefficients standing for 
inflationary pressures and those for output gap will be lower during electoral periods in 
comparison with the normal times.   
The thesis is structured as follows. The Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive literature 
review on the research conducted so far in this area, mentioning the main channels of 
political influence on the monetary policies, the most often methodology employed, as 
well as the main unexplored research fields. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical 
methodological framework which will be used in this thesis. It provides a description of 
the econometric models employed for testing the PMC hypothesis, as well as the non-
linear specification of the central banks’ reaction function. Chapter 3 outlines the 
hypotheses which are tested using the methodology described in the chapter 2 and 
provides a discussion about the empirical results. The main explanatory factors making 
some central banks vulnerable to political manipulations are discussed in chapter 4. The 
chapter 5 introduces the dynamic inconsistency problem and analyzes the outcomes of 
politically sensitive central banks. The final concluding remarks are outlined in the 
chapter 6. The reference list and annexes including the regression results and Gretl 
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Chapter 1: How Monetary Policy can switch to 
Monetary Politics? 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of research conducted so far on the issues 
related to political constraints imposed on the monetary policy, mainly through the 
theory of Political Business Cycles or Political Monetary Cycles developed in ’70. First 
of all, I will present the main models which describe the central banks’ behavior under 
political pressures and how they may change their reaction functions to inflation and 
unemployment. This theoretical insight about election induced monetary policies will be 
followed by an illustration of the empirical evidence about the persistence of political 
pressures on the central banks from many countries all other the world. Since it is 
directly related to the way how politicians and electorate perceive the inflation and 
unemployment – the main determinants of central bank’s reaction functions – we will 
provide some research background on political inferences of these crucial 
macroeconomic indicators. The final part of this chapter comprises a review of the main 
methodological tools used for estimating the degree of political influence on the 
monetary authorities.   
The democratic systems create 2 main types of incentives for incumbent politicians to 
exercise pressures on the monetary authorities: (i) electoral and (ii) partisan ones. As a 
result, the research on political constraints on central banks can be divided into 2 main 
directions: (i) electoral-motivated and (ii) partisan-motivated monetary policies. The 
first one is related to the so-called Political Business Cycles theory, according to which 
the incumbent politicians influence the central bank reaction function before elections in 
order to spur output growth and decrease unemployment. The second theory states that 
the monetary policy is influenced by the party ideology, such that right-wing parties, 
which are represented mainly by owners of capital, force the central banks to implement 
more aggressive monetary policies with respect to inflation; while the left-wing parties, 
which are represented by owners of human capital, try to tilt the monetary policies in 
order to stimulate employment.  
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1.2 Channels of Influence 
Before going into details about each of these models of political influence of the central 
banks, it is worth mentioning the most seminal research papers aimed at underlying the 
main channels of influence. Havrilesky (1995) provides an interesting discussion about 
the reason of political influence on FED, which accommodates the presidential wishes 
before election in exchange for political protection against legislative initiatives which 
could threaten its independence in the period after elections. In this way, the central 
bank gives up its independence in the short run, in order to gain more independence in 
the long run.  
A crucial channel of political influence, widely discussed by researchers, is the power of 
appointment. Thus, Havrilesky and Gildea (1992) argue that presidents usually chose 
economists which have similar views and ideologies. Additionally, Waller (1989) and 
Keech and Moris (1997) found that due to the influence through the power of 
appointment the political regime changes cause sluggish policy shifts in the central bank 
as the president spend some time for “packing the Board” with loyal supporters. Thus, 
we can notice that this channel of influence causes more often partisan motivated 
monetary policy, which has been revealed by Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor 
(1993).  
Since in most central bank the monetary policy stance is decided at the periodic 
meetings of committee members, the persistence of the power of appointment channel 
can be depicted by the analysis of committee decisions based on the voting of each 
committee member. For example, Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1993) argue 
that the Fed Chairman has disproportionate weights in committee decisions which 
undermine the simple median voter hypothesis. Additionally, McGregor (1996) found 
how committee decisions were influenced by the electoral cycles. Thus, he empirically 
estimated that before elections the members appointed by the party of the incumbent 
president were voting for easier policy stance, while the members of opposition favored 
more tightness.      
Electoral-Motivated Monetary Policies 
The first most seminal and well-known paper which introduced the notion of Political 
Business Cycles was that of Nordhaus (1975) who defined a micro- and macroeconomic 
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framework according to which the economics and politics are closely interrelated. The 
main assumptions employed by the author where: 
a) The economy can be described by an “expectations augmented” Philips curve; 
b) Expectations are adaptive; 
c) Politicians have control over the aggregate demand through a set of instruments 
(e.g. monetary or fiscal policy) 
d) The primary aim of politicians is to get elected and/or reelected (“opportunistic 
behavior”) 
e) Voters value high output, low unemployment and inflation. They are 
retrospective and make their electoral decisions based on the past performance 
of politicians. Additionally, they heavily discount the future (“myopic voters”).  
Thus, he argued that incumbent politicians wishing to be reelected seek for votes’ 
maximization by influencing the myopic electorate whose preference function is driven 
mainly by inflation and unemployment and who have adaptive expectations (the 
expectations of current policy are based on past policy). As these variables are the main 
factors which guide the monetary policy decisions, the incumbent party may exercise 
some political pressures in order to shape the central bank’s behavior. As a result, 
during electoral periods the monetary policy may be pro-cyclical and not counter- 
cyclical as the theory suggests. Additionally, before elections incumbent politicians, by 
use of easy monetary policy, engineer economic booms, which are followed by an 
economic contraction in the post-election period. Hence, the inflation is higher in the 
proximity of elections due to pre-electoral expansionary monetary policy and gets lower 
after some periods after elections as a result of monetary contraction. In any case, the 
economy which is subject to Political Business Cycles is characterized by stronger 
“inflation bias”, where the level of inflation is higher than the “social optimum”.  
It is worth mentioning that the assumption that the voters prefer incumbents who 
achieved better macroeconomic results is supported by most office-seeking models. 
Thus, Kramer (1971), Stigler (1973), Tufte (1978), Arcelus and Mertzer (1975), Fair 
(1978 and 1988) and Hibbs (1987) provide robust evidence that higher economic 
growth, lower unemployment and inflation explain the incumbent parties’ success in US 
presidential elections. These findings are supported by more evidence from Germany, 
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France, Italy, UK and Spain by Beck (1988), and from Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
by Madsen (1980).  
The research in this area is enriched by the influential Gordon’s model (1975), where 
the main aim of the incumbent politicians is to get reelected, while their popularity 
ratings directly depend on economic conditions. As voters usually seek lower taxes, 
higher wages, lower unemployment and higher output, the politicians exercise pressures 
on the central banks’ in order to support these policies before elections. 
Correspondingly, it turns into an easier monetary policy before elections and tighter one 
after elections in order to overcome the engineered inflation. This issue was 
comprehensively analyzed by Wright (1974), Tufte (1978), Frey and Schneider (1978), 
Golden and Poterba (1980), Schultz (1995) and Price (1998) who found that 
incumbents’ incentives to electioneer are rising with expected proximity of elections. 
Moreover, according to Alt (1985) these incentives are lower the bigger is the number 
of elected policy makers sharing the power. 
In early ‘90s emerged a new wave of models based on rational expectations theory 
which reformulated the initial Nordhaus conception of “political business cycles”. The 
most important assumption employed by these models is related to the utility function 
of governments, which is similar to that of private agents, except their “opportunistic 
behavior”. Thus, governments tend to use all the available instruments in order to 
maximize their utility function from wining the elections and getting more power. The 
most prominent exponents of this upgraded view on the political business cycles theory 
are Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1991).  
Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1991) wrote a seminal paper for a panel of 18 OECD 
countries in which they found that the monetary policy is usually easier before elections 
while the inflation is higher after elections. This may be the cause of the pre-electoral 
monetary expansion as a result of the political pressures on the central banks from the 
incumbent parties. At the same time, the paper did not validate the Nordhaus theory of 
Political Business Cycles, as they found no evidence that the economic growth and 
employment are higher before elections. Additionally, the estimates of election induced 
monetary policy wasn’t stable, being interpreted by the authors that there are some 
electoral cycles in monetary policy stance, but these cycles do not occur always and in 
each country of the analyzed panel.  
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Nowadays, there is still no consensus among academic circles on the evidence of 
political business cycles theory as it wasn’t validated by some empirical studies. For 
example, Alesina (1997) finds little signs of pre-electoral effect on monetary policy in 
USA. However, in most cases, the researchers rejected the evidence of policy outcomes 
(e.g. increasing output and decreasing unemployment before elections), while the 
evidence of electoral manipulations with policy instruments (e.g. monetary and fiscal 
policy) is mixed. For example, McCallum (1978), Paldam (1979), Golden and Poterna 
(1980), Hibbs (1987) and Alesina and Roubini (1990) rejected the Nordhaus theory.  
Partisan-Motivated Monetary Policies 
Whereas, according to the election-motivated monetary policies the policy makers are 
perceived as office-seekers, the partisan approach treats them rather as policy seekers. 
The reason is behind the different motives of monetary policy manipulation: in the first 
case the incumbent party is described by a purely opportunistic behavior, wishing to be 
reelected and caring little about policies and outcomes per se; and, in the second case, 
political parties do care about policies and, therefore, are trying to persistently influence 
the central bank’s behavior according to their ideology.  
Nordhaus (1975) mentions another channel of influence by politicians on the monetary 
policy stance – “parties’ ideology”. Thus, the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, also known as the “Phillips Curve”, is differently perceived by parties’ 
principles: some of them (e.g. Republicans) might put more emphasis on keeping 
inflation as low as possible, while others (e.g. Democrats) – on minimizing 
unemployment, even with a cost of inflation. These findings were confirmed by Hibbs 
(1977), who observed that the unemployment rates were lower under left-wing than 
under right-wing political regimes. A similar evidence has been provided by Cowart 
(1978) for governments from Europe.  
There is mammoth additional research evidence about the persistence of partisan 
induced monetary policies, especially for USA. Thus, a significant added-value was 
brought by Hibbs (1987), who estimated that Democrat supporters penalize incumbents 
1.1 times as much for unemployment as for inflation, whereas Republican supporters 
and Independents supporters punish them only 0.65 and 0.49 times as much for 
unemployment as for inflation. Additionally, Beck (1982) and Chappell (1993) found 
partisan monetary effects via federal appointments. Johnson (1995), Simmons (1996), 
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Oatley (1999), Franzese (1999, 2002) got similar findings with larger samples, 
controlling the domestic and international institutional and structural context. 
Additionally, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) provided robust empirical evidence 
supporting the rational partisan cycles across a panel of 18 OECD countries.  
However, as in the case of electoral-motivated monetary policies, there is no consensus 
on the persistence of partisan induced cycles. Hence, some researchers are quite skeptic 
about the impact of incumbent party ideology on the monetary policy. For example, 
Sieg (1997), Vaubel (1997) and, especially, Cusack (2000), finds evidence about 
partisan monetary policy only under right-wing governments, while in the case of left-
wing governments the results are not statistically significant. Moreover, Clark (1998) 
using several combinations of central bank autonomy, exchange-rate regimes and 
capital mobility, argues that there is no evidence about partisan monetary policies. 
Alesina (1997), also, did not find strong partisan differences in money growth for USA. 
Similar skepticism is shared by Alesina and Perotti (1995), Hahm (1996), Ross (1997) 
and Boix (2000). Such divergences between researchers’ findings are explained by 
Schmidt (1987) who suggests that the evidence about partisan monetary policies 
depends heavily on the international and domestic political-economic institutional, 
structural and strategic context.  
1.3 Evidence about Election Induced Monetary Policy 
Nordhaus (1975), who pioneered the research on electoral induced monetary policy, 
presented, also, some empirical evidence in this area. Thus, in the period 1947-1972 he 
finds that the political business cycles were observed in Germany, New Zeeland and 
United States and, to a lower extend, in United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Japan. 
In these countries, the polities tend to be expansionary before elections, as the 
unemployment rate has been decreasing while inflation – increasing, while after election 
– vice-versa. Tufte (1976) supported this evidence, mainly for USA, proving that some 
presidents provoked election-year economic booms to ensure their reelection. The 
research was continued by Weintraub (1978) and Pierce (1978 and 1979),  who, also, 
found a politically induced monetary policy, based on monetary growth acceleration 
prior elections and its deceleration after elections for USA; and by Duesenberry (1983) 
who also argued that FED was indeed influenced by political considerations. 
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The ‘80s are marked by a new wave of research of political influence on monetary 
policies, which was, also, extended from USA to the old continent. Thus, Aftalion 
(1983) found some empirical evidence for France according to which the changes of 
Government shaped the central bank’s reaction function. Additionally, Willms (1983) 
found that in situations of conflict between the Government’s output growth objective 
and the Bundesbank’s price stability objective, the central bank could not resist the 
political pressures and had to follow the Government policy.  
These findings where confirmed by the research conducted over the last 2 decades. 
Hence, Alesina (1992 and 1993), provided robust empirical evidence about monetary 
expansion prior elections in a dataset for OECD countries. Franzese (1999, 2002), also, 
finds some post-electoral inflation surges for OECD countries which constitute a lagged 
effect of monetary expansion before elections. This evidence is confirmed by Clark and 
Hallerberg (2000) and Hallerberg (2001 and 2002). The electoral induced monetary 
policy is, also, found in most of studies on developing democracies: Ames (1987), 
Krueger and Turan (1993) and Remmer (1993).  
Still the most comprehensive research on political monetary cycles has been conducted 
for the USA. Thus, Kane (1980 and 1982) argued that FED faces a lot of political 
constraints which causes sub-optimal monetary policy. Grier (1987) identified a regular 
16 quarters cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections in US and 
after the simulation of a simple macro model a classical political business cycle for 
inflation and unemployment was obtained. Beck (1987) and Sheffrin (1989) also report 
about US electoral monetary cycles, as the money growth get higher before elections.  
Political Economy of Inflation and Unemployment 
The trade-off between inflation and unemployment and, particularly, how it is perceived 
by parties and voters forms a crucial research area which is directly related to the 
political influences on the central bank’s behavior. Thus, the seminal paper of Nordhaus 
(1975) argues that the electorate wants both low unemployment and low inflation. 
However, due to the lagged effect on the price level as a result of a money supply shock 
the politicians prefer to use the monetary policy for stimulating the output and 
combating the unemployment before elections and manage the inflationary pressures 
after. Therefore, since both politicians and voters in a democratic system are considered 
to be myopic by nature, their short-term preferences are biased in favor of lower 
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unemployment and higher inflation than the optimum. Respectively, this is the main 
source of political pressures on central banks, which are forced, before elections, to be 
less assertive about inflation and promote an easier monetary policy in order to keep the 
unemployment as low as possible. This assumption is confirmed by Gordon (1976), 
who had an influential contribution in arguing that a major cause of the supply of 
inflation is the elections’ proximity which makes the myopic incumbent party to force 
increasing money supply. The reason for this is to satisfy the demand for inflation as a 
result of the need to increase nominal government expenditures or wages. 
These findings of Nordhaus and Gordon are supported by the theory of time 
inconsistency problem developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) which explain the 
political bias towards inflationary policies. Barro and Gordon (1983) applied this theory 
to monetary policy. Basically it states that, since policymakers value both low inflation 
and high output, in case of steering inflationary expectations at zero level, policymakers 
have the incentive to spur output through a money supply shock. However, this doesn’t 
hold due to rational expectations, which make the public to anticipate the future actions 
of the monetary authority. The final results is that inflation will be always positive in 
equilibrium, at the level where marginal costs of inflation equal marginal gains in 
output. Therefore, in order to avoid suboptimal inflationary equilibrium, it is necessary 
to appoint a conservative policymaker who is less concerned about output than inflation 
(Rogoff, 1985). Additionally, it is crucial to ensure a full independence of the central 
bank, as Cukierman (1992) finds a close connection between independence of the 
monetary authority and low inflation.  
Another important source of political demand for inflation is the seigniorage, which can 
ensure the government with an important source of revenue when the tax institutions are 
less efficient and political systems are less stable (Cukierman, 1992). Additionally, 
inflation may be supplied by the central bank itself for revenue purposes. Thus, Toma 
(1982) argued that the Fed usually deals with bureaucratic incentives for monetary 
expansion, as it implies trading no-interest bearing cash for interest-bearing bonds 
which fund its operational budget. Tollison and Shughart (1983) supported this theory 
by providing empirical evidence that the monetary expansion is associated with 
increasing employment of Fed.  
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1.4 Methods of Estimation 
A common approach in assessing the impact of electoral cycles on the monetary 
policies is the analysis of central bank’s reaction function. Particularly, the research is 
conducted either by looking at how this reaction function evolves over time (e.g. 
whether it is subject to some cyclical disturbances associated with the elections periods) 
or dummy variables for each election year.  
Willms (1983) uses an extension of social loss function, incorporating the rate of 
inflation and unemployment, as well as output growth, which shape the central bank’s 
monetary policy instruments according to the formula: 
         
  
     
 
   
     
 
   
     
 
   








     
 
  
 , where: 
   and   
 – rate of inflation and desired rate of inflation 
   and   
  - growth rate of real GNP and potential rate of real GNP 
   and   
 – unemployment rate and neutral unemployment rate 
     and     
  - growth rate of Central Bank Money and its neutral growth rate.  
Respectively, the author found that in periods when Bundestag’s objective was 
contradicting the Government policy, the reaction function was biased in favor of 
stimulating the output growth and decreasing the unemployment with some inflationary 
costs. Thus, higher coefficients for unemployment and inflation revealed the preference 
of the monetary for these objectives.  
Grier (1987) builds a model where the money supply is regressed on its autoregressive 
components, reflecting some kind of policy inertia, and a set of dummy variables 
standing for different shapes of electoral monetary policy cycles. Thus, the model tests 
whether any of these electoral variables Granger-cause money growth: 
                                                    , 
where 
    – change in money supply (M1) 
     - autoregressive component of money supply 
    -     – dummy variables for various shapes of electoral cycles  
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Allen (1986) extended this model by introducing additional explanatory variable into 
the equation, such as output gap (    ), unemployment (   , inflationary expectations 
(  
 ), net federal debt (     ), three-month Treasury Bill rate (   ), and a dummy 
variable defining the electoral cycles (  ).  
                               
                    
 
   
 
Alesina and Roubini (1991) used another straightforward empirical tool in estimating 
the implications of opportunistic political business cycles theory on the monetary 
policy. Similar to the model of Grier (1987 and 1989), they used the following equation 
for the pooled cross-section time-series: 
                                              , where 
    – the rate of money growth (M1) in country i in time t. 
       - the electoral dummy which takes on a positive value for the last 3 or five 
quarters before the election and during the quarter of the election.  
Additionally, Alesina and Roubini (1991) use the following model for testing the 
“partisan/opportunistic” interaction: 
                                                        
              ,  
where: 
       - dummy variable standing for the lest-wing government in country i in time t.  
        and         are the interactions terms between PBCN (the dummy from the 
previous equation) and the left and right wing government dummies respectively.  
However, this estimation method could hardly be employed nowadays since most of 
central banks use policy interest rates rather than money supply as main monetary 
policy instruments. Additionally, money supply may increase prior elections due to 
higher Government expenditures or parties’ expenditures, as well as higher private 
credit used to financing of electoral campaigns. As a result, there could be a natural 
increase in money supply, without any political influence on the central bank’s 
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behavior. Hence in order to avoid spurious conclusions about political monetary cycles, 
the money supply variable should be replaced with the central bank’s policy rate or 
short-term interest rates which could better describe the monetary policy stance.  
1.5 Concluding Remarks: Depicting Main Unexplored Fields  
While the early research was focused mainly on identification of empirical evidence and 
motivations for electoral induced monetary policies, the last wave of research in this 
area is related to the linkages between central banks’ independence and their 
vulnerability to political constraints. Thus, Bernhald and Leblang (1999, 2000 and 
2002), Franzese (1999 and 2002), Oatley (1999), Boix (2000), Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000), Clark (2002), argue that incumbents’ capacity and effectiveness in manipulating 
monetary policy depends on central bank’s independence.  
Respectively, the evidence of electoral monetary policies may be a reliable proxy for 
measuring the degree of central banks’ independence. Assuming that it affects the 
credibility of the monetary authority and its capacity to steer the inflationary 
expectations in the economy, a solid body of research may be devoted to assessing the 
impact of electoral monetary cycles on the efficiency of central bank’s policy and its 
transmission process. Thus, the research should not stop at some pure econometric 
evidence about the impact of electoral cycles on the monetary policy, but should rather 
continue in estimating the economic benefits of having an immune central bank from 
political constraints or the costs of electoral induced monetary policies.    
Although, the new wave of research of the relationship between electoral cycles and the 
monetary policies has shifted to the analysis of policy instruments (e.g. base rate) rather 
than policy outcomes (e.g. monetary aggregates), most of papers do not take into 
account two crucial facts about central bank’s behavior: (i) it can have an asymmetric 
behavior depending on the proximity of elections; (ii) it may change its monetary policy 
stance over time. These facts have significant implications for the analysis of the central 
bank’s reaction functions, which are rather dynamic than fixed. A recent contribution in 
this direction was made by Baxa, Horvath and Vasicek (2010) who estimated the 
reaction functions of the central banks in several inflation targeting countries based on 
the moment-based estimator in a time-varying parameter model with endogenous 
regressors.  
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Following the argument of regime switching behavior of the central banks depending on 
the proximity of elections, the monetary policy rule should rather be estimated in a non-
linear setting instead of a linear one. Respectively, it will provide a better goodness of 
fit for the countries with politically sensitive central banks.  
Last, but not least, the research on election induced monetary policies were mostly 
concentrated on developed economies (mostly USA) and pay less attention to 
developing countries. The main reason is the constraints related to data availability and 
quality, as well as short and very volatile time series. However, nowadays, many of 
these countries significantly increased the quality of their statistical databases, which 
made possible conducting research in these areas. Hence, it is worth estimating the 
sensitivity of monetary policies in these countries, where the issue of political 
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Chapter 2: The Methodology 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter outlines the theoretical and empirical methodological framework employed 
for testing the validity of Political Monetary Cycles hypothesis. Thus, it includes the 
theoretical description of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS models which will be used in this 
research. Additionally, the non-linear model specification will be introduced in order to 
control for regime shifting behavior of politically influenced central banks.  
2.2 Description of Econometric Models: OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
The political monetary cycles hypothesis will be tested by comparing the regression 
results of three estimation techniques: (i) ordinary least squares (OLS), (ii) two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) and (iii) three-stage least squares (3SLS). Particularly, 2SLS model 
is used due to potential correlation between the explanatory variables and the error 
terms (endogeneity problem), which makes the OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. 
Additionally, 3SLS is used due to eventual non-diagonality of variance covariance 
matrix which hampers the parameters’ efficiency, making the standard errors biased. 
Obviously, Hausman’s Specification Test will help us to depict these problems and, 
thus, use the right estimation method.  
The central banks’ reaction functions for the analyzed countries could be estimated 
jointly via ordinary least squares (OLS) according to the formula: 
                    where                                        
   and    – inflation and output gap of the i
th
 country and               of 
countries 
Additionally, the reaction function may contain an interest rate smoothing parameter to 
control for monetary policy inertia: the central bank spreads the shocks of new 
economic news through several periods of time in order to better anchor the 
expectations and prevent adverse policy shocks (increase in inflation or output decline). 
Hence, the inertial reaction function is obtained by adding the partial adjustment 
component to the original equation: 
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At the same time, following Rudebusch (2006), this policy gradualism which was 
strongly advocated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Fuhrer (2000), Bernanke 
(2004) and others, may be spurious. The main reason is that the statistical significance 
of the interest rate smoothing parameter may be due to omissions of other persistent 
factors that shape the monetary policy. Hence, a better goodness of fit may be reached 
by estimating a non-inertial reaction function, but with serially correlated error terms. 
Such specification could be more realistic because it controls for other factors which 
cause the deviation of the monetary policy stance from the theoretical (e.g. data 
revisions, supply-side shocks etc). Therefore, the inertial reaction function is compared 
with the non-inertial one, but with serially correlated error terms: 
                         
                   
 
Consequently, the decision in favor of inertial or non-inertial reaction function will be 
made according to the goodness of fit information criteria.  
In fact, this is the simplest estimation method, which employs quite strong assumptions 
about no endogeneity and no autocorrelation. However, these could not be true due to 
the high probability that some explanatory variables from the central bank’s reaction 
function are correlated with the error terms. In this case, OLS estimated are not 
consistent and biased. Therefore, in order to solve the endogeneity problem we can 
employ 2SLS. 
2SLS can control for country specific shocks which enter the reaction function as error 
terms and which can be correlated with the explanatory variables. Additionally, there is 
a causality issue leading to a simultaneous bias: besides the fact that the central bank’s 
policy rate may be shaped by the inflationary pressures and output gap, it can also 
influence these variable, though with a certain lag.  Thus, without using instrumental 
variables, the OLS estimated parameters may be biased and inconsistent. In order to 
solve this issue, both determinants of monetary policy decisions (inflation and output 
gap) entering the central banks’ reaction function will be estimated as endogenous 
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variables, being determined inside the system with the help of additional exogenous 
variables.  
Hence, instead of univariate regression, simultaneous equation models will be 
employed. Thus, the current CPI (   ) will be regressed on its lagged values (     ) and 
the lagged values of the policy rate (     ), while the GDP gap (     will be expressed as 
a function of its lagged values (     ) and the industrial production index gap (  ).  
According to the 2SLS methodology, in the first stage the endogenous variables are 
regressed on its determinants (1
st
 stage) and, in the second stage, the obtained fitted 
values of endogenous variables are introduced into the central bank’s reaction function 
(2
nd
 stage). As a result, the new determinants of the central bank’s policy rate are 
uncorrelated with the error term and have sufficient explanatory power. Theoretically, 




                                , 
where      and     are endogenous variables. In the 1
st
 stage these are regressed on a set 
of exogenous variables which should be highly correlated with     and    , but 
uncorrelated with    : 
                            






 stage, once the fitted valued obtained from the 1
st
 stage are not correlated with 
the error term, we may use OLS in order to regress the central bank’s policy rate with 
the fitted values of these endogenous variables: 
                              
While 2SLS is a single equation model which is estimated in the 2
nd
 stage by OLS it is 
vulnerable to potential biasness problem of the parameters’ standard errors. Thus, in 
many cases, the inappropriate exogenous variables (instrumental variables) may 
generate significant efficiency loss of the 2SLS estimators. This could be the problem of 
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diagonality of variance covariance matrix of the error terms which may be solved by 
using Generalized Least Squares method instead of OLS.  
In this case, Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) method can be used, which is somehow 
similar to the so-called Seemingly Unrelated Regression model (Baldagi, 2006) because 
it contains the assumption of contemporaneous correlation among residuals. In this case, 





   
    
   










which can be written as: 
      ,  
Where   accounts for all exogenous and endogenous variables,   - a vector of 
regression coefficients of all variables and   has zero mean and the variance-covariance 
matrix is     , implying some possible correlation among disturbances. Hence, this 
system is estimated using GLS: 
        
         
                
    
  
 
We can simplify this formula and estimate   by getting the residuals after running 
2SLS: 
                                                
Finally, we get the 3SLS estimator: 
         
    
  
      
  
      
  
       
Therefore, if the system is properly identified, 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS.  
In our case, the 3SLS will be applied for the following system of equations which will 
be estimated jointly: 
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2.3 Hausman’s specification test 
For testing which estimation technique is more appropriate: OLS, 2SLS or 3SLS, 
Hausman’s specification test will be used: 
It tests the following hypotheses: 
            (no correlation between explanatory variable and the error term) 
            (the explanatory variable and the error term are correlated) 
 
The test is calculated based on 2 estimators: (i)    is consistent and efficient under    
and becomes inconsistent under   ; (ii)    is consistent under both hypotheses and 
inefficient under   . Thus, the first one is estimated with OLS or 3SLS while the 
second one – with 2SLS.  
Hausman’s specification test is calculated based on the vector of contrasts which is the 
difference between these 2 estimators according to formulas: 
         ,                          (and   
           which converges 
to   
 , where k is the dimension of  .  
According to this test, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis about no correlation 
between explanatory variable and the error term there is no major difference between 
the parameters estimated with OLS and 2SLS. In this case, we should use OLS as it is 
unbiased, more efficient then 2SLS and easier to estimate. However, if we reject the 
null and find that the explanatory variable and the error term are correlated, we should 
use 2SLS which is gives unbiased estimators. Moreover, we may prefer 3SLS over 
2SLS, since it estimates the system jointly and generates more efficient parameters.  
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2.4 The Identification Problem 
Since the estimation of the central bank’s reaction function is based on a system of 
equations, in which the endogenous variables are defined within additional structural 
equations, it is necessary to check whether the system is identified or not. This is crucial 
for simultaneous equation models because an unidentified system may cause perfect 
multicollinearity when running 2SLS and/or 3SLS (Kelejian and Oates, 1989). 
Moreover, an under-identified model generates less meaningful results. According to 
Bekker and Wansbeek (2001), “Scientific conclusions drawn on the basis of such 
arbitrariness are in the best case void and in the worst case dangerous.” Hence, in order 
to perform correctly these estimation methods, we need at least several excluded 





 equations.  
Following Baltagi (2006), a necessary condition for identification of any structural 
equation is that the number of excluded exogenous variables from this equation are 
greater than or equal to the number of right hand side included endogenous variables. 
Let K be the number of exogenous variables in the system, then this condition 
requires         , where      –   , where    stands for the number of RHS 
exogenous variables.  
In our case, the endogenous variables (  ) are the short-term interest rate (   ), inflation 
rate (   ) and output gap (   ). The exogenous variables ( ) are the lagged short-term 
interest rate (     ), lagged inflation rate (     ), industrial producers prices index (  ) 
and the industrial production index gap (   ). Let us check, based on the order 
condition of identification whether the equations included in our system satisfy the 
requirement  –       . 
                                                             : 5 – 1   2 (over-identified) 
                                                    :             5 – 2  0 (over-identified)   
                                                    :   5 – 2   0 (over-identified) 
Hence, we can conclude that our system is over-identified. However, the order 
condition for identification is necessary, but not sufficient condition for identification. 
Thus, it is useful only when the condition is not satisfied. In our case, we have to 
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continue with the rank condition for identification in order to check for sure whether 
the system is identified.  
In order to compute the rank condition for identification we rewrite our simultaneous 
equations model into the following form: 
           ,  
where     stands for endogenous variables and     - for endogenous variables.  
                                                                       
                                                               
                                                              
Next, we construct the matrix A which comprises the coefficients of the endogenous ( ) 
and exogenous variables ( ). A more detailed description about the methodology is 
provided by Baltagi (2006).  
   
         
   
   
     
       
     
   
     
   
      
     
    
  
  
      
  
In order to compute the rank condition for identification for each equation we have to 
multiply the matrix A with the transposed vectors of zero restrictions (  
    
    
 )  
imposed for each equation, as follows: 
                           
                         ) 
                           
1
st
 equation:     
  =  
 
         
         
   => rank = 2 ≥ 3 – 1 (just identified) 
2
nd
 equation:     
  =  
           
 
          
   => rank = 2 ≥ 3 – 1 (just identified) 




 equation:     
  =  
           
          
 
   => rank = 2 ≥ 3 – 1 (just identified) 
In conclusion, the simultaneous equations model is just identified which means that this 
specification is appropriate and we can continue with its estimation.  
2.5 Discussion of Model Specification 
The impact of electoral cycles on the monetary policies of analyzed countries will be 
tested via a non-linear reaction function, assuming a regime switching behavior 
depending on the elections’ proximity. Hence, central banks’ reactions to inflationary 
pressures and output gap will be compared between two different periods: electoral and 
non-electoral one. Thus, our model takes a non-linear form, by introducing the electoral 
and non-electoral regimes which are identified by a binary variable (E) standing for 1 
for 4 quarters before the election date and 0 for normal times. The “electoral reaction 
function” is obtained by multiplying each variable with E, while the “non-electoral 
reaction function” – by multiplying each variable with (1 – E). Additionally, we 
compare the non-linear policy rule with partial adjustment: 
                                                  
         
                                          
             
with the non-inertial reaction function with serially correlated error terms (Rudebusch, 
2006): 
                                     
                              
                                         
                            
where: 
   – short-term interest rate, as a proxy for the monetary policy stance 
   - current inflation (     
      
   - the difference between the current GDP (    and the potential one (  
 )  
  – a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for electoral period (4 quarters before 
the election’s day) and 0 for normal times.  
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The output gap will be estimated as a deviation of the current GDP from its potential 
level. The potential level is approximated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1997) with a standard smoothing parameter for quarterly time-series (λ = 
1600). Although, this approach of estimating the potential output suffers from the so-
called end point bias, other flaws being well-documented by Harvey and Jaeger (1993), 
it has a wide application among researchers (Baxa, Horvath, Vasicek, 2011)
1
. 
We expect that    is positive due to the central bank’s commitment to ensure price 
stability (higher prices calls for tighter monetary policy) and    should also be positive 
due to the counter-cyclical nature of the monetary policy. The same holds true for 
parameters    and   . Since during electoral periods the central bank may become less 
inflation averse and postpone its counter-inflationary actions after elections, we expect 
  , which measures the degree of inflationary aversion of the monetary authority in the 
proximity of elections, to be lower than   . Additionally,   , which stands for the 
central banks’ commitment to prevent the economy from overheating during electoral 
periods, is expected to be lower in comparison with   . Since this model is able to 
capture the non-linear behavior of monetary authorities influenced by electoral cycles, it 
has a higher goodness of fit and, respectively, lower errors, in comparison with the 
linear models. 
For 2SLS and 3SLS, the central bank’s reaction function will be estimated with the help 
of additional equations. Thus, in the case of inertial policy rule the system of equations 
is specified as follows: 
                             
                           
         
             
                              
                                          
      
                    
                   
      
                        
                          
                                                          
1
 Following Billmeier (2004),The HP filter is a linear, two-sided filter that computes the smoothed series 
by minimizing the squared distance between trend (  
 ) and the actual series (  ) subject to a penalty on 
the second difference of the smoothed series:  
 
The penalty parameter, λ, controls the smoothness of the series by setting the ratio of the variance of the 
cyclical component and the variation in the second difference of the actual series. A higher value for λ 
implies a smoother trend (and, hence, more volatile gaps).  In the extreme case of λ → ∞, the trend is a 
straight line. The standard value in the literature is λ = 1600 for quarterly data, which is also assumed as a 
base case in the analysis. 
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Where,   ,      ,         ,       
     and       
         are 
endogenous variables, being determined inside the system, while the rest of variables 
are exogenous.  
2.6 The Dataset 
The dataset comprises quarterly time series of 4 macroeconomic indicators used for 
estimating the central bank’s reaction functions for each of the 10 countries included in 
the group of advances economies and other 10 countries considered emerging and 
developing economies. The indicators are: (i) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which, in 
most cases, is expressed in logarithms
2
; (ii) Industrial Production Index (IIP); (iii) 
Consumer Price Index
3
; (iv) short-term interest rates, used as a proxy for the monetary 
policy stance. For proper estimation of the central bank’s reaction function, the output 
gap has been computed as a deviation of the current GDP from its potential level 
approximated by its linear trend (HP filter). The data are collected from OECD 
statistical database, Eurostat and central banks’ websites of the analyzed countries.  
The electoral and non-electoral periods are approximated using a dummy variable 
standing for 1 for the period of 4 quarters before elections. The information about 
electoral years was taken from the following web portals: electionresources.org and 
electionguide.org. Given the assumption about politicians aiming at votes’ 
maximization, there were used data about general direct elections.  
The countries were divided into advanced and developing economies following the IMF 
classification. The list of countries from both categories, along with data descriptive 
statistics is presented in table 1 and table 2.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the data used for advanced economies 
 GDP IPI CPI STI E 
1. Australia      
Mean -4.7811e-016 -4.5841e-016 75.649 8.9262 0.38710 
Min -6.0683 -5.5837 30.7 3.16 0 
Max 4.7673 2.8263 116.7 19.47 1 
Std. Dev. 1.7070 1.6526 23.756 4.5362 0.48906 
2. Canada      
                                                          
2
 Given the data availability constraints, for some countries q-o-q growth rates of real GDP was 
considered. 
3
 Due to data constraints and the accuracy issues related to expected inflation, I use actual inflation data 
(Jeong and Maddala (1996), Evans and Honkapohja, (2001), Horvath and Mateju (2011)).  
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Mean 7.1627e-017 1.6045e-015 80.111 6.9006 0.30645 
Min -5.9484 -8.5366 39.8 0.38167 0 
Max 3.3124 5.961 109.8 20.738 1 
Std. Dev. 1.9277 2.6099 18.786 4.3196 0.46289 
3. Czech Republic      
Mean 3.6752e-016 3.1852e-015 3.5747 4.9286 0.27586 
Min -0.032995 -13.607 -0.37383 1.2067 0 
Max 0.043307 10.818 13.292 19.673 1 
Std. Dev. 0.020301 5.2639 3.0625 4.5037 0.45085 
4. Denmark      
Mean -3.7680e-016 -1.6508e-015 2.4217 5.3625 0.34343 
Min -0.051802 -9.3617 0.93721 0.59227 0 
Max 0.042619 7.1706 4.9898 14.053 1 
Std. Dev. 0.016451 3.1476 0.95689 3.3130 0.47727 
5. Estonia      
Mean 3.2289e-015 9.4739e-015 4.2958 3.841 0.25 
Min -16.736 -24.252 -1.9 1.13 0 
Max 8.235 13.271 11.5 7.84 1 
Std. Dev. 5.6321 8.9433 2.8477 1.862 0.43759 
6. Japan      
Mean 8.9800e-016 1.9677e-015 101.08 0.24162 0.30769 
Min -9.0621 -21.981 99.6 0.001 0 
Max 4.831 9.4385 103.6 2.1889 1 
Std. Dev. 2.3311 5.3231 1.1791 0.34687 0.46513 
7. Norway      
Mean -1.1190e-016 -1.7903e-015 4.1658 8.1127 0.25197 
Min -0.073247 -6.2892 -1.3998 1.8933 0 
Max 0.093476 4.1079 14.621 16.5 1 
Std. Dev. 0.032806 1.8836 3.3887 4.3627 0.43586 
8. New Zeeland      
Mean -1.1985e-016 3.0683e-015 90.480 7.3575 0.31818 
Min -3.7135 -5.4921 68 2.7251 0 
Max 4.0708 3.8407 117.6 14.287 1 
Std. Dev. 1.7764 2.2042 12.767 2.7511 0.46844 
9. Sweden      
Mean -1.4927e-016 -1.3136e-015 3.5206 6.7988 0.30252 
Min -0.04866 -13.338 -1.4166 0.16333 0 
Max 0.054103 9.3374 11.301 15.133 1 
Std. Dev. 0.019919 3.3848 3.2042 4.3939 0.46129 
10. USA      
Mean 1.1804e-015 1.6485e-015 78.107 5.9073 0.256 
Min -5.4135 -9.0974 41 0.22000 0 
Max 4.6617 6.1335 114.4 18.65 1 
Std. Dev. 1.7607 2.4164 20.638 3.7831 0.43818 
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Source: OECD, Eurostat, individual central banks’ websites 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the data used for emerging and developing economies 
 GDP IPI CPI STI E 
1. Bulgaria      
Mean 2.2204e-016 1.0806e-014 6.1688 2.4329 0.25 
Min -0.044752 -10.828 -0.2 0.17 0 
Max 0.061517 12.536 14.7 5.55 1 
Std. Dev. 0.02235 5.6262 3.5637 1.5284 0.43759 
2. Brazil      
Mean 2.9606e-017 -1.1842e-015 86.863 19.336 0.53333 
Min -0.0435 -15.246 51.6 8.75 0 
Max 0.039051 8.809 129 46 1 
Std. Dev. 0.015465 4.0203 24.178 8.6561 0.5031 
3. Hungary      
Mean 0 8.6126e-016 9.861 11.741 0.24242 
Min -0.061488 -14.702 2.5372 0 0 
Max 0.049784 13.232 30.377 33.367 1 
Std. Dev. 0.022667 5.3652 7.3113 8.0447 0.43183 
4. Chile      
Mean 3.5527e-016 -2.1316e-015 96.94 6.7147 0.26667 
Min -0.040053 -5.0134 71.9 0.43 0 
Max 0.03938 6.3964 120.8 30.79 1 
Std. Dev. 0.01881 2.7932 14.185 5.4067 0.44595 
5. Moldova      
Mean 2.6456e-016 5.6125e-015 11.171 13.822 0.57447 
Min -0.052708 -19.611 -2.298 5 0 
Max 0.043267 15.348 39.407 31.33 1 
Std. Dev. 0.021839 7.905 7.5932 5.9173 0.49977 
6. Poland      
Mean 1.8559e-016 -1.3787e-015 7.3301 11.59 0.47761 
Min -0.083734 -9.3825 0.30883 3.8233 0 
Max 0.039376 10.909 32.792 29.71 1 
Std. Dev. 0.026073 3.6448 7.5528 7.9996 0.50327 
7. Romania      
Mean 1.8897e-016 5.3291e-015 14.342 15.781 0.33333 
Min -0.037745 -7.9906 3.2 2.87 0 
Max 0.072402 11.952 49 52.95 1 
Std. Dev. 0.024928 4.2895 12.485 12.776 0.47639 
8. Russia      
Mean -1.5118e-016 3.6283e-015 112.94 8.6511 0.2553 
Min -0.047862 -10.022 105.75 4.2333 0 
Max 0.077259 7.4977 123.68 21.143 1 
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Std. Dev. 0.027404 3.8952 4.535 3.9006 0.44075 
9. Turkey      
Mean -8.2621e-016 3.6353e-015 18.377 23.122 0.27907 
Min -0.18349 -21.298 3.99 1.5 0 
Max 0.070546 11.42 68.53 81.19 1 
Std. Dev. 0.052131 6.2773 17.619 19.01 0.45385 
10. Slovenia      
Mean -3.2030e-015 3.5527e-016 3.58 3.9428 0.3 
Min -9.8048 -13.931 0 0.66217 0 
Max 4.1802 13.717 7.5 8.6333 1 
Std. Dev. 3.3523 5.7182 2.0293 2.294 0.4641 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, individual central banks’ websites  
  
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
In order to obtain unbiased and efficient parameters, several estimation methods will be 
employed. OLS will be used in case there will be no endogeneity problem as well as for 
the sake of comparison with other estimators. Otherwise, 2SLS will diminish the 
estimators’ biasness with additional exogenous variables. However, due to efficiency 
loss suffered by this method, 3SLS will be preferred which, besides solving the 
endogeneity problem, will ensure unbiased standard errors due to its assumption of non-
diagonality of variance-covariance matrix of the error terms.  
Hence, the reaction function of the central bank will be estimated using univariate and 
multivariate models, where the inflation and output gap will be defined inside the 
system with the help of several relevant exogenous variables. Obviously, Hausman’s 
Specification Test will be used for uncovering the endogeneity problem. Additionally, 
our simultaneous equations model will be tested for identification using order and rank 
conditions.  
In order to better capture the regime switching behavior of the central bank depending 
on electoral cycles, the policy rule will be estimated within a non-linear setting. Thus, 
the central banks’ aversion to inflation and its commitment to promote a counter-
cyclical monetary policy are compared during electoral and non-electoral periods. 
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Chapter 3: Discussion of Empirical Results 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter provided a discussion about the main hypotheses used in our research, as 
well as about the empirical results derived with the methodology outlined in chapter 2. 
The regression outputs are compared among various specifications and models. Based 
on the Hausman’s Specification Tests, the tests on equality of parameters and 
information criteria about the goodness of fit we choose the best option. Following 
these results, we make the final conclusions about the validity of political monetary 
cycles for each country.   
3.2 The Main Hypotheses 
Before providing the empirical results it is necessary to specify the hypotheses which 
will be tested in this research. These are: 
1. The central banks are pressed by politicians to promote a looser monetary 
policy before elections, in order to ensure, on the short-run, a more dynamic output 
growth. Thus, the coefficient standing for inflation aversion and the counter-cyclical 
behavior in the central bank’ reaction function will be lower during electoral periods in 
comparison with the normal times (      and      ). The evidence of such 
political monetary cycles was found by Boschen and Weise (2003), Grier (1987), and 
Haynes and Stone (1989). At the same time, these finding contrasted with that of 
Alesina and Roubini (1992), Beck (1987), Golden and Poterba (1980), and Leertouwer 
and Maier (2001). 
2. The influence of electoral cycles on the monetary policy is less observed in 
advanced economies and is more persistent in emerging and developing countries. This 
could be due to a higher degree of independence and, thus, reputation, enjoyed by the 
first ones (Mishkin and Westelius (2006)). In this case, the discrepancy between the 
reaction function coefficients is much lower between the two sets of countries and the 
number of developing countries where PMC are found is higher than that of advanced 
economies. This hypothesis was tested and confirmed by Alpanda and Honig (2007), 
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who found no evidence of political monetary cycles in advanced countries, but found 
strong evidence in developing countries.  
3. In countries where the evidence of electoral induced monetary policy is more 
persistent the central banks have a lower reputation, which imply negative repercussions 
on the monetary policy efficiency. Particularly, these economies suffer from inflation 
bias as the central bank cannot anchor the inflationary expectations, while the monetary 
policy transmission is much slower. This hypothesis refers to the reputational models 
developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983) 
on the time-inconsistency problem and Blinder (1998) and Mishkin and Westelius 
(2006) on the importance of central bank independence in reducing this problem. Thus, 
we will test whether the inflation volatility is higher in countries with PMC in 
comparison with the rest of the sample.  
4. In countries with political monetary cycles, the inflation tends to be higher 
around elections in comparison with the normal times. This is the direct outcome of 
easier monetary policy implemented during electoral periods under the pressures of 
incumbent politicians in order to boost the economy. This hypothesis was confirmed by 
Grier (1989), Klein (1996), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Drazen (2001).  
Full regression outputs are presented in Annex B, while the table 3 and table 5 
synthesize the estimated coefficients standing for central banks’ inflation aversion 
during electoral (  ) and non-electoral periods (  ) and their counter cyclical behavior 
during electoral (  ) and non-electoral periods (  ). Although, the Hausman Test 
rejected the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for each estimated equation and revealed 
that 3SLS is the most efficient and unbiased estimator, the results for OLS and 2SLS are 
also included for comparison reasons. Additionally, for countries where the presence of 
electoral monetary cycles was confirmed empirically, an additional test for equality of 
estimated parameters was run by applying linear restrictions. The test results are 
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3.3 How Politically Sensitive are the Central Banks from 
Advanced Economies? 
The estimated central banks’ reaction functions, using the inertial Taylor rule, for the set 
of advanced economies rejects the hypothesis of political monetary cycles. Following 
the Hausman’s Specification Test which revealed the biasness and inconsistency of 
OLS estimates we resorted to simultaneous equation models. Particularly, due to 
substantial efficiency gains, 3SLS is preferred in comparison with 2SLS (table 3).  
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Table 3: OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS Estimation Results of Central Banks` Reaction Functions in Advanced Economies (   and    are the 
coefficients for the reaction of monetary policy to inflation and output gap in electoral periods;     and    – measure the same reaction in non-
electoral periods).  
 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 





























































































































































































































































Source: Author’s computations 




It is worth pointing out that these results are derived from a central bank’s reaction 
function with an interest rate smoothing parameter which controls for the so-called 
monetary policy inertia. Thus, it is assumed that the monetary policy reaction to new 
economic news is distributed over many periods of time. Hence, the policy rule contains 
the following partial adjustment component:                  . However, if we 
estimate a non-inertial reaction function we find more evidence about political monetary 
cycles (Table 4).  
Table 4: 3SLS Estimation Results of Non-Inertial Central Banks` Reaction 
Functions in Advanced Economies (   and    are the coefficients for the reaction of 
monetary policy to inflation and output gap in electoral periods;     and    – measure 
the same reaction in non-electoral periods). 
 3SLS 



























































































Source: Author’s computations 
Note: With the red fond are marked countries were PMC are statistically significant. 
Thus, we can notice that the evidence about the PMC is highly sensitive to model 
specification. It calls for a careful and robust analysis of the right model in terms of 
theoretical and econometric principles. This finding is corroborated by Belke and 
Potrafke (2009) who argue that the evidence about ideology induced monetary policy is 
present only in the model without lagged short-term nominal interest rate, while it 
disappears whenever the regression includes this autoregressive component.    
However, such a simple estimation of the reaction function cannot be adequate given 
the omitted variable bias which makes the estimated coefficients irrelevant. Thus, 
following Rudebusch (1995), central banks tend to adjust their policy interest rates in 
sequences of relatively small steps. Additionally, Ben Bernanke (2004), argued that 
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central banks use partial adjustment and monetary policy inertia intrinsically. Hence, the 
reaction functions must be enriched with interest rate smoothing parameters to measure 
the speed of monetary policy adjustment. Moreover, according to Rudebusch (2006), 
this estimation method ensures a much better fit and a greater explanatory power in 
comparison with the non-adjustment model. One of the main arguments in favor of 
monetary policy inertia is the possibility of the central bank to move and manage 
expectations and, thus, control for macroeconomic fluctuations. Therefore, partial 
adjustment can be optimal if the private sector is forward looking and the central bank is 
fairly committed to a gradual policy rule. These arguments are supported by the success 
of estimated inertial reaction function in fitting the real data (Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1999 and Fuhrer, 2000).  
At the same time, the argument that central banks intrinsically resort to monetary policy 
gradualism, supported by Bernanke (2004), was opposed by Rudebusch (2002b, 2006). 
He argued that the monetary policy rule estimates are misleading and provide just the 
illusion of monetary policy inertia. It means that usually the desired policy rate may 
depend on some other factors than output gap and inflation which could result in some 
spurious finding of partial adjustment. In other words, it is very hard to distinguish 
between a reaction function of a central bank which follows partial adjustment and the 
one with no policy inertia but where the central bank deviate from the rule in response 
to other factors. Therefore, instead of monetary policy gradualism hypothesis, 
Rudebusch (2006) proposes a different explanation of central banks’ deviation from its 
policy rule: incomplete description of the monetary policy. This issue can be controlled 
by estimating a non-inertial reaction function of the central bank with serially correlated 
error terms (which are able to capture other factors which in some periods may cause 
the monetary authority to deviate from the regular reaction function).  
In light of this academic debate between the proponents of intrinsic policy gradualism 
and those of partial adjustments, we compare the results obtained from inertial reaction 
and a non-inertial one with serially correlated errors, estimated with 3SLS. This 
estimation method has been chosen due to its efficiency gains compared to the 2SLS 




Table 5: 3SLS Estimation Results of Inertial and Non-Inertial Central Banks` 
Reaction Functions for Advanced Economies (   and    are the coefficients for the 
reaction of monetary policy to inflation and output gap in electoral periods;     and    – 
measure the same reaction in non-electoral periods). 
 Inertial Model with no serially 
correlated errors 
Non-inertial model with serially 
correlated errors 



















































     F(1,606) = 7.00815 [0.0083] 
























































































































       F(1,211) = 2.05383 [0.1533] 
Source: Author’s computations 
Note: The parameters obtained from non-inertial model with serially correlated errors are marked with 
bulk due to better goodness of fit. With the red font are marked countries were PMC are statistically 
significant and the F-tests rejecting the null hypothesis of equality of parameters. 
The estimation results reveal a much better goodness of fit for the non-inertial reaction 
functions with serially correlated error terms. This model expresses much better the 
behavior of central banks in advanced economies and provides a more efficient 
estimates then the inertial model. Hence, the final model specification used for testing 
for politically monetary cycles and to which we give our final preference is the non-
inertial reaction function with serially correlated error terms, estimated with 3SLS 
(GLS).  
According to this specification, regime switching behavior of the central bank is found 
in 3 out of 10 advanced economies. However, only in 2 of these countries the test on 
equality of reaction parameters to inflation and output gap in electoral and non-electoral 
years was strongly rejected. Hence, the countries were PMC are statistically significant 
are: Norway and USA (marked with red font in table 5).  
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In the case of Norway, inflation aversion proves to be lower during electoral periods ( 
   <   ), while the test on equality of parameters was rejected (F(1,606) = 7.00815 
[0.0083]). It means that the central bank promotes a looser monetary policy before 
elections in order to stimulate output on the short term and, in this way, buy votes. At 
the same time, the counter-cyclical behavior of the central bank appears to be milder 
during electoral periods since its reaction to output gap is lower in comparison to 
normal times (   <  ).  
A similar regime switching behavior in electoral and non-electoral periods is found for 
USA. Thus, the estimated 3SLS coefficients for FED response to economic cycles’ 
fluctuations suggest that the central bank is pro-cyclical before elections. The 
discrepancy appears to be quite strong and it survives the test for equality of parameters 
(F(1,596) = 7.43334 [0.0066]) and serves as a robust evidence of the presence of 
electoral induced monetary policy in USA. At the same time, during non-electoral 
periods, the central bank is counter-cyclical: the monetary policy gets tighter in 
response to output gap growth. This finding is consistent with other papers which did 
not reject the hypothesis of political monetary cycles for US (Golden & Poterba (1980), 
Paldam (1979, 1981), Grier (1989) and Klein (1996)), revealing the vulnerability of 
FED to political pressures.  
3.4 How Politically Sensitive are the Central Banks from 
Developing Economies? 
As in the case of advanced economies, the most efficient estimates are derived from 
3SLS which control for the bias problem associated with OLS. Additionally, it appears 
to be more efficient than the 2SLS as it takes into account the non-diagonality of 
variance covariance matrix by performing generalized least squares.  
Hence, based on 3SLS estimation results, we can notice that regime switching behavior 
of the central banks was found in 5 out of 10 countries, but only in 3 countries the test 
for equality of parameters was rejected.  
48 
 
Table 6: OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS Estimation Results of Central Banks` Reaction Functions in Advanced Economies (   and    are the 
coefficients for the reaction of monetary policy to inflation and output gap in electoral periods;     and    – measure the same reaction in non-
electoral periods). 
 OLS 2SLS 3SLS 


























         








































































































































































































































Source: Author’s computations 




Thus, in Russia the monetary policy is strongly pro-cyclical during electoral periods 
(the interest rates decrease in response to higher output). In Romania the central bank 
becomes less inflation averse before elections in comparison with non-electoral periods. 
In Turkey, the reaction function is very different in the proximity of elections from 
normal times. Thus, it is counter-cyclical and anti-inflationary during non-electoral 
periods, while before elections it deviates from this rule and, apparently, becomes 
discretionary, as neither the reaction parameter to inflation, nor to output gap is 
statistically significant (table 6). 
For the sake of comparison, table 7 presents the 3SLS estimation output of non-inertial 
reaction function of the central bank: the monetary policy is solely explained by CPI 
and output gap, while interest rate smoothing parameter was subtracted.  
Table 7: 3SLS Estimation Results of Non-Inertial Central Banks` Reaction 
Functions in Emerging and Developing Economies (   and   are the coefficients 
for the reaction of monetary policy to inflation and output gap in electoral periods;     
and   – measure the same reaction in non-electoral periods). 
 3SLS 



























































































Source: Author’s computations 
Note: With the red fond are marked countries were PMC are statistically significant. 
We can notice that the PMC hypothesis was not rejected for 5 out of 10 countries, 
where electoral induced monetary policies were found after estimating the inertial 
reaction function. However, due to reasons mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, such 
specification, most probably, suffers of omitted variable bias, as policy gradualism or 
other shocks impacting the monetary policy stance are not taken into account. The 
estimation of the non-inertial model is rather useful for analyzing the sensitivity of 
estimation results to the inclusion/exclusion of partial adjustment component.  
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Following the discussion from the previous sub-chapter, the inertial reaction function 
estimates are compared to those obtained from non-inertial model but with serially 
correlated error terms, both estimated with 3SLS due to reasons mentioned earlier. 
Based on the goodness of fit we can select which specification is better.  
 
Table 8: 3SLS Estimation Results of Inertial and Non-Inertial Central Banks` 
Reaction Functions for Emerging and Developing Economies (   and    are the 
coefficients for the reaction of monetary policy to inflation and output gap in electoral 
periods;     and    – measure the same reaction in non-electoral periods). 
 Inertial Model with no serially 
correlated errors 
Non-inertial model with serially 
correlated errors 


















































































































































































Source: Author’s computations 
Note: The parameters with highlighted with bulk are considered the most efficient. With the red font are 
marked countries were PMC are statistically significant. 
Thus, after selecting the most efficient and unbiased specification and which fits the 
data variations in the best way, we can conclude that in 4 out of 10 emerging and 
developing countries the monetary policies are influenced by electoral cycles. These 
are: Moldova, Romania, Russia and Turkey. Additionally, for these countries the test on 
equality of parameters was strongly rejected.  
Our estimations reveal that the behavior of the central bank of Moldova is best 
described by a non-inertial model with serially correlated error terms (probably due to 
many exogenous shocks hitting the country). Hence, it becomes less inflation averse in 
electoral periods. A similar finding holds for Romania, where besides being less 
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inflation averse before elections, the central bank is less counter-cyclical in comparison 
with normal times. In Russia the central bank changes its behavior only in response to 
output gap shocks, being strongly pro-cyclical before elections. Finally, in Turkey, 
during electoral periods, the monetary policy turns to be pro-inflationary.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
We outline four main hypotheses which will are tested using the methodological 
framework described in the previous chapter. According to the first one, the incumbent 
politicians wishing to be reelected tilt the monetary policy to a looser side before 
elections in order to boost the economic growth and employment. Thus, the central 
bank’s inflation aversion and counter-cyclical behavior is milder during electoral 
periods in comparison with the normal times. The second hypothesis states that, due to a 
better institutional framework, the evidence about PMC is less visible or even absent in 
developed economies in comparison with the developing ones. According to the third 
hypothesis, the inflation bias is the main outcome of politically sensitive central banks. 
Thus, the inflation volatility is higher in countries with PMC in comparison with those 
where the monetary policy did not prove to be election induced. The last hypothesis 
states that the inflation around elections is higher in comparison with normal times. 
The main findings of this chapter are: 
 The evidence about PMC is sensitive to model specification, especially in the 
case of advanced economies. For example, the estimation based on a policy rule 
with partial adjustment reveals that the monetary policies in these countries 
proved to be not influenced by the electoral cycles. At the same time, if we 
estimate a simple non-inertial rule, the PMC prove to be statistically significant 
for 6 out of 10 advanced countries from our sample.  
 Out of all estimation methods, preference was given to the non-inertial reaction 
function with serially correlated error terms, estimated with 3SLS (GLS), due to 
its efficiency gains and higher goodness of fit in comparison with the inertial 
policy rule.  
 Following this method, as well as the test on equality of parameters, PMC was 
not rejected for 2 out of 10 advanced economies from our sample. These are 
Norway, where the central bank proved to be less inflation averse during 
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electoral periods, and USA where the FED promotes a pro-cyclical policy before 
elections and counter-cyclical one in normal times.  
 The evidence about PMC is more persistent in developing and emerging 
economies. Thus, in 4 out of 10 countries from our sample the monetary policies 
proved to be influenced by electoral cycles. These are: Moldova, Romania, 
Russia and Turkey. Additionally, for these countries the test on equality of 
parameters was strongly rejected. 
Hence, we can conclude that the 1
st
 hypothesis is proved only partially, as not in all 
countries the central banks are politically sensitive and the monetary policies are 
manipulated by the incumbent politicians. The 2
nd
 hypothesis was entirely proven, since 
the PMC are much better observed in developing and emerging economies. In the next 
chapter we will analyze the reason behind this vulnerability of monetary authorities to 










Chapter 4: What makes the Central Banks 
Vulnerable to Political Pressures? 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
In the previous chapter we have identified several countries where the central banks’ 
behavior are influenced by the electoral cycles: in the proximity of elections the 
monetary policy, usually, tilts to the easing side in order to stimulate growth and job 
creation. Two of these countries are from the developed economies group (USA and 
Norway) and four – from the developing economies group (Moldova, Romania, Russia 
and Turkey). In this chapter we will try to dig deeper in order to understand the main 
causes eroding the political independence of these central banks and the transparency of 
their policy actions.  
This analysis will, also, imply a comparison with the central banks’ independence index 
(CBI) elaborated by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and updated by Crowe and 
Meade (2007). The index is based on 4 main characteristics of the central banks’ 
independence: 
1. Appointments. The highest degree of independence (1) is received by banks 
where the governors are appointed by their boards and not by the legislative or 
executive branch of the government, for more than eight years, cannot be 
dismissed for any reason and do not hold any other positions in the government.  
2. Policy Formulation. The highest ranking is given to the central bank formulated 
its own policy (without the advice or participation of government), had final say 
in the resolution of a conflict about its legal objectives, and played an active role 
in the government’s budget process.  
3. Policy Objective. A central bank was judged most independent if its law 
specified a single objective for price stability. Its score was lower if the law 
specified multiple, compatible objectives including price stability, and lower still 
if its multiple objectives were potentially in conflict with price stability. The 
lowest scores is obtained if the central bank’s law stated no policy objectives or 
if these objectives did not include price stability.  
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4. Limits on Central Bank Lending to the Government. The most independent of 
central banks would have at most a very limited role in the financing of 
government deficits.  
There are many channels through which votes seeking politicians may influence the 
central banks’ behavior in their own interests: appointing loyal members to the bank’s 
board, participation of Government officials in the decision making process of the 
central bank, defining the objective in close coordination with the Government, public 
audit etc. Hence, the degree of independence is directly related to the institutional 
design and legislative framework.  
It is worth to mention that the failure to meet any of these criteria can have negative 
outcomes for the central banks’ activity, the monetary policy efficiency and the overall 
macroeconomic framework. Thus, when the monetary policy is delegated to a not fully 
independent central bank, it hampers its accountability and limits the public’s control 
over this institution. Additionally, poor independence coupled with a high margin of 
discretion makes the central banks vulnerable to the influence of political factors. It 
creates perverse incentives for politicians to tilt the monetary policy to their own 
interests with medium and long-run repercussions on the society’s interest. Last but not 
least, poor independence paralleled by unclear accountability significantly hampers the 
central banks’ operational efficiency. Finally, all this negative outcomes are amplified 
by the lack of transparency of banks’ decision making process.  
In fact, transparency has an important impact on central bank’s independence, as it 
enhances its accountability and enforced the public’s control over its activity, which 
minimizes the incentives of politicians to influence the monetary policy. Crowe and 
Meade (2007) provided a comprehensive measurement framework for the central 
banks’ transparency. Thus, they constructed a transparency index which took into 
account 5 components: 
1. Political Transparency pertains to the clarity of the central bank’s legal 
mandate; 
2. Economic transparency refers to the publication of the economic data, models, 
and forecasts used by the central bank to arrive at its policy decisions; 
55 
 
3. Procedural transparency is the communication of the explicit policy strategy as 
well as information on the decision-making process; 
4. Policy transparency includes the timely announcement and explanation of 
policy actions, and some indication of likely future actions; 
5. Operational transparency is the discussion of economic disturbances and policy 
errors that are likely to affect the transmission of policy. 
All these aspects will be assessed for each of the countries where the political monetary 
cycles proved to be statistically significant: Norway, USA, Moldova, Romania, Russia 
and Turkey.  
4.2 Norges Bank (The Central Bank of Norway) 
The CBI index for the central bank of Norway is much lower in comparison with the 
average among the same indexes for other countries included in our group of advanced 
economies (0.32 in comparison with 0.51). Its weakest point is related to the unclear 
specification of the policy objective. Thus, the bank has several policy objectives which 
imply price stability, financial stability and added value in investment management. 
Additionally, the aspects related to policy formulation and limits on lending to 
government, also, hardly comply with the best practices of the most independent central 
banks. Both are evaluated with 0.27 points in CBI index.  
Other important factors which hamper the independence of the Norges Bank are related 
to the following facts, which were discussed in more details by Torvik, Vredin and 
Wilhelmsen (2012): 
 All members of its Board are appointed by the government and, also, depend on 
the government for renewal of their terms. Consequently, it can serve as a 
channel for political influence before elections, by forcing its Board to vote for 
easier monetary policy.  
 Some members of the Board do not work full time for the central bank and have 
other jobs outside the bank. It is a quite challenging form of organization and 
could make the Board biased in its decision making.  
 The governors and deputy governors, in many cases, had a background of active 
politicians, while most of them used to work for the government, before 
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appointment. Moreover, a governor without work experience in the ministry has 
not been appointed since the Second World War.  
 The Norges Bank Act states that “Before the Bank makes any decision of 
special importance the matter shall be submitted to the ministry”. It refers to the 
Ministry of Finance, which confirms the close tie between the central bank and 
the government. Moreover, the main decision submitted on a regular basis is the 
decision on the interest rate. Particularly, before each Board meeting, the 
governor and the deputy governor informs the Ministry of Finance about the 
interest rate decision which they intend to recommend to the Executive Board. 
Thus, it is quite safe to assume that in electoral periods, the rent seeking 
incumbent government has the necessary tools for tilting the central bank’s 
officials to the side of stimulating the economic growth even above its potential 
level in order to spur aggregate demand, investments and employment. 
 The government has legal rights to modify the decisions made by Norges Bank. 
It is an additional possibility for political manipulations outlined above and is 
based on the Norges Bank Act which states that “The King in Council may 
adopt resolutions regarding the operations of the Bank. Such resolutions may 
take the form of general rules or instructions in individual cases. The Bank shall 
be given the opportunity to state its opinion before such resolutions are passed. 
The Storting shall be notified of resolutions as soon as possible.”  
Besides the legal aspects limiting the Norges Bank independence, there are several 
constrains related to the transparency of its activity. Despite the fact that, according to 
the central banks’ transparency index, it is ranked almost at the average level of other 
advanced economies included in our sample (0.7 in comparison with 0.73), it got zero 
points for policy transparency. Additionally, little information is published from the 
meetings of the Executive Board. Particularly, the bank does not issue the minutes about 
the discussed issues and votes of individual members. Consequently, it negatively 
influences the accountability and limits the incentives for the Board members to 
increase the quality of the decision making process.  
4.3 Federal Reserve (Central Bank of USA) 
The CBI index for the Federal Reserve is slightly below the average of other advanced 
economies from our sample (0.48 in comparison with 0.51). Its main drawback in terms 
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of best practices of most independent central banks is related to policy formulation. 
Indeed, there is no clear objective followed by FED, which enjoys a large margin of 
discretion. Thus, according to the FED Act, the Board of Governors and the Federal 
Open Market Committee should seek “to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Depending on the 
overall macroeconomic framework and, as uncovered by our empirical analysis, 
country’s political situation, the central bank decides to which objective priority should 
be given.  
Besides the unclear stipulation of its goals, they can enter in direct contradiction with 
each other. For example, in the situation of demand side inflationary pressures, calling 
for monetary policy tightening, the objective of stable prices contradicts with the one 
related to maximum employment. At the same time, ensuring maximum employment 
usually fuels aggregate demand which makes the firm to adjust the prices upwards 
leading to higher inflationary pressures.  
Additionally, the FED monetary policy is hardly insulated from the fiscal one. This 
deficiency was uncovered during the recent world financial crisis when it committed to 
holding the interest rates at a very low level by purchasing as much Treasury debt as 
necessary to maintain the interest rates at their minimum levels.  
4.4 The Central Bank of Moldova 
The central bank of Moldova was not included in the independence index of Crowe and 
Meade (2007). However, the analysis of the legislative framework can reveal several 
important features which make this central bank quite sensitive to electoral cycles.  
 The Law of the National Bank of Moldova obliges it to support the general 
economic policy of the government, without threatening its main goal: ensuring 
and maintaining price stability. Although this may seem reasonable, the 
formulation “(…) without threatening of its main goal (…)” may be subject to 
various interpretations. For example, it may be forced to support the electoral 
stimulation of employment by easing or at least keeping constant its policy rates, 
while the resulting inflationary outcomes are motivated by the strong cost-push 
factors or adjustments to regional prices. As a result, the rhetoric of central 
bank’s officials is mostly based on the idea that the inflationary pressures are 
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driven by factors which are out of the monetary policy control (climate 
conditions, production costs, regional prices). Although this points seem 
plausible for an open economy which is highly dependent on imports and 
agriculture, this rhetoric did not change even during periods of 30% y-o-y 
growth in money supply over 2010.  
 Despite the fact that the Law of the Central Bank of Moldova clearly stipulates 
the interdiction to grand credits or other guarantees to the government, it allows 
the bank to buy T-bills with maturities of no more than 180 days through open 
market operations. As a result, given the repercussion of the current Euro zone 
sovereign debt crisis, the National Bank of Moldova issued an official statement 
about its commitment to buy T-bills from commercial banks for the next 2 years. 
The main purpose of this action is to pump liquidity into the banking system and 
make the monetary policy more predictive and credible. However, it serves as a 
support for the Government since it fuels the demand for t-bills, driving down 
the borrowing costs. Hence, this legislative statement creates the possibility to 
monetize the fiscal deficits under political pressures before elections.  
 Despite its recently adopted inflation targeting strategy, the central bank’s 
activity implies many transparency issues. Particularly, the bank’s balance sheet 
is not publicly available. The minutes of the Board meetings are not published as 
well. There is only a short statement about the monetary policy decision and its 
motivation, without stating the voting pattern and the debates during the 
meeting. Additionally, the econometric model used by the bank is not publicly 
available so that it cannot be replicated, which negatively influences its 
credibility. Moreover, the bank does not hold consultation meetings with 
relevant expert and scientific community. All these issues undermine the 
efficiency of monetary policy decisions and the public accountability of the 
central bank. 
 Finally, most of legislative requirements ensuring the political independence of 
the central bank were introduced in the mid-2006, under the recommendations 
of IMF. It means that before that date, the legislation was lacking such basic 
principles as: a clear specification of the policy objective; direct statement that 
the Government cannot interfere into the central bank’s activity; the monetary 




4.5 The Central Bank of Romania 
The CBI index of the central bank of Romania lies below the average of developing 
countries included in our sample (0.59 in comparison with 0.74). Its weakest point is 
related to poor limits on central bank’s lending to government, scoring only 0.47 points. 
Other legal issues were outlined by the ECB Convergence Report (2010) which 
concluded that the Law of the central bank of Romania does not comply with all the 
requirements for central bank independence. Particularly, the following issues could be 
emphasized: 
 Article 43 of the Law provides that central bank of Romania must transfer to the 
State budget an 80% share of the net revenues left after deducting expenses 
relating to the financial year, including provisions for credit risk, and any losses 
relating to previous financial years that remain uncovered. This arrangement 
may in certain circumstances amount to an intra-year credit, which in turn may 
undermine the financial independence of the central bank (ECB, 2010).  
 The same Law states that the auditing of the central bank is made by 
independent audits selected by the Board based on a legal tender. Nevertheless, 
the Law concerning the organization and functioning of the Court of Auditors 
empowers the Court of Auditors to control the management and use of central 
bank’s financial resources and to audit management of the funds of the central 
bank. As mentions ECB in its Convergence Report (2010), the scope of this 
audit is not clearly specified by the legislation. Hence, at least theoretically, it 
opens a door for the Government to exercise certain political pressures on the 
central bank.  
 
4.6 Central Bank of Russia 
There are many factors which restrict the independence of the central bank of Russia. Its 
CBI index is below the average of the developing economies from our sample (0.62 in 
comparison with 0.74). Its main drawback, as revealed by Crowe and Meade (2007) is 
related to policy formulation. Indeed, the legislation does not stipulate a clearly a single 
monetary policy objective. Instead, it states that the central bank of Russia should 
ensure the stability of the national currency, strengthen and develop the banking sector 
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and maintain an efficient payments system. Besides this, many other issues related to 
the independence of this central bank stem from the deficiencies of the democratic 
system as a whole characterized by high centralization of political and executive power, 
strong state influence of economic activity and, respectively, political interference into 
the monetary policy (Johnson, 2004). The main factors hampering the independence of 
the central bank of Russia are: 
 The composition of the National Banking Council of the central bank reveals a 
strong appointment channel for political pressures: the 12 members include 3 
representatives from the government, 3 from the presidential administration, 5 
from the legislature and only 1 from the central bank of Russia. Hence, it limits 
the bank’s autonomy and provides the incumbent politicians the necessary tools 
for exercising political pressures.  
 Most of the governors and vice-governors had active political background 
and/or used to be employed by the government. For example, the current 
governor appointed in 2002 used to be First Deputy Finance Minister and 
presidential aide. As a result, the insulation of the monetary policy from the 
fiscal one is quite blurred, the central bank being highly influenced by the 
executive branch of the power.  
 The central bank is one of the least transparent in comparison with the analyzed 
countries with a transparency index of only 0.2 points. Thus, the bank earned 
zero points for economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency.  
 
4.7 The Central Bank of Turkey 
Despite a relatively high CBI index (0.85) in comparison with the average among the 
sample countries (0.74), there are several issues which made the central bank of Turkey 
exposed to political pressures and electoral cycles. The most important of them are: 
 According to the Law of the Central Bank, the Board members are elected only 
for 3 years, which comes in contradiction with the best practices of independent 
central banks, which state that the governor and the Board have to be elected for 
a period longer than the electoral cycle.  
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 The Governor is appointed by the Council of Ministers, which is the executive 
branch of the government. It also does not comply with the main principles of 
central bank’s independence according to which the governors are appointed by 
the legislative power of the president.  
 The Law on the Central Bank states that “The Prime Minister may have the 
operations and accounts of the Bank audited”, which could be a measure of 
political influence on the bank. Normally, the central bank hires an external 
auditing firm, based on a tender, while the government shouldn’t have such 
prerogatives.  
 Generally, the same Law lacks any direct specification that the Central Bank of 
Turkey is independent and the monetary policy is insulated from the fiscal one. 
Moreover, there are no clear stipulations prohibiting the practices of lending to 
the Government.  
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
For each country where the monetary policies proved to be politically sensitive there 
were depicted the main factors affecting the central banks’ independence. Additionally, 
transparency issues were, also, considered as important buffers against the political 
pressures from the incumbent government. In most cases, the major deficiencies lay in 
the institutional design and legislative framework which leave some rooms for political 
manipulations of the central banks. Particularly: 
 The Board of the central bank of Norway is appointed by the government and 
can be easily dismissed. Additionally, the bank has close ties with the executive 
power both unofficially (e.g. some governors and deputy governors used to work 
for some ministries) and officially (e.g. the governor and deputy governors must 
consult with the Ministry of Finance about their policy decisions). Moreover, the 
government has legal rights to modify the decisions made by the Norges Bank. 
Besides these, there are many transparency issues (e.g. little information is 
published from the meetings of the Executive Board).  
 The main peculiarity which creates the possibilities for political manipulations 
of FED is related to its large margin of discretion. Thus, it has multiple 
objectives and the central bank decides to which of them priority should be 
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given. Additionally, these objectives often can enter in contradiction with each 
other (e.g. stable prices and high employment).  
 Most of legislative requirements ensuring the political independence of the 
central bank of Moldova were introduced in the mid-2006. It means that before 
that date, the legislation was lacking basic principles of central bank’s 
independence and insulation of monetary policy from the fiscal one. 
Additionally, the bank doesn’t publish the minutes of Board meetings, the 
econometric model used for their forecasts or even the bank’s balance sheet.  
 According to the ECB Convergence Report (2010), the Law of the central bank 
of Romania does not comply with all the requirements for central bank 
independence. Particularly, it relates to its financial independence and the 
unclear aspects of auditing of its activity.  
 The low independence of the central bank of Russia derives from the high 
centralization of executive and legislative powers. Thus, the main issues are 
related to the unclear specification of policy objectives, close ties with the 
government and poor transparency.  
 In Turkey, the main tools which can be used by the government to influence the 
monetary policy decisions are: (i) the Board is appointed only for 3 years; (ii) 
the Governors is appointed by the government; (iii) government may conduct 
the audit of the central banks, and (iv) no clear specifications about insulation of 








Chapter 5: The Outcomes of Political Monetary 
Cycles 
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
While the previous chapter outlined the main factors explaining the election induced 
monetary policy, this chapter discusses the main outcomes for the economy with a 
politically sensitive central bank. Thus, it provides a theoretical framework for 
describing the dynamic inconsistency problem and its resulting inflation bias. These 
hypotheses are empirically tested on our samples of advanced and developing 
economies. Particularly, we analyze the differences in the inflation level in electoral and 
non-electoral periods. Additionally, we compare the inflation volatility between 
countries with and without political monetary cycles, according to the findings from 
chapter 3.  
5.2 The Dynamic Inconsistency Problem and Inflationary Bias 
In order to better understand the outcomes of politically sensitive central banks, which 
are directly linked to their independence, it is necessary to elaborate on the dynamic 
inconsistency problem and its inflationary bias effect, following the seminal paper of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and the lecture notes of Mr. T. Hollub (2011). 
First of all, we will discuss the impact of central bank’s deviation from its policy rule 
under the assumption of rational expectations. 
Point A from the figure 1 marks the initial state of the economy where the inflation (π) 
is at its lowest level (due to central bank’s inflation aversion), while the unemployment 
at its structural level. Once the central bank, under political pressures, deviates from its 
rule and promotes a looser monetary policy, the economy moves to point B. Now, while 
the inflation level does not exceed the society’s indifference curve, the unemployment is 
driven below its structural level. Obviously, it helps the incumbent politicians to buy 
more electorate, as voters enjoy more incomes in nominal terms and the economy is 
boosted above its potential level. However, under a rationality assumption this may not 
remain a long-term equilibrium because the population incorporates any inflation 
surprises into their expectations. Hence, in the long-run, the central bank is penalized 
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for its discretionary policy and political sensitivity which makes it harder to anchor the 
inflationary expectations. As a result, given the distortionary effects of inflation, the 
economy shifts to the point E, as the unemployment reverts to its structural level and the 









Thus, the temptation of the central bank to deviate from its commitment to ensure price 
stability and boost employment by engineering extra inflation leads, finally, to a strong 
inflation bias with negative effects on the entire economy. It is worth mentioning that if 
people would be rational in the short-run, not just in the long run as it was the case in 
our example, the economy would switch directly to point E, without any short-term 
benefits earned in point B. Hence, we can conclude that the politicians are exploring the 
short-term irrationality of their voters by engineering inflation in order to immediately 
boost the economy, while its consequences are felt with a certain time lag.  
This pattern of monetary policy which periodically generates inflation surprises creates 
a dynamic inconsistency problem. To describe this issue, let’s assume an economy 
where the output (  ) is determined by its potential level (  
 ), inflation surprise 
(deviation of current inflation from its expected level: (     
 ) and a supply side 
shock (  ): 
Phillips Curve:      
        
       
  
                                    E
               B
                                    A
                                                   Unemployment
Figure 1: Philips Curve and inflation bias 
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Respectively, the central bank follows a social loss minimization function: its policy 
rate (  ) is positively correlated with the inflationary pressures multiplied by an 
inflation aversion parameter (   ) and deviation of the current output from the desired 
one (     
   .  
Social loss function:        
        
      
Additionally, the desired level of output is assumed to be higher than its potential level, 
revealing the policy makers’ tendency to boost the economic above its potential: 
Output target:     
     
    
In order to determine the optimal level of inflation, given this setting, we plug in the 
Phillips Curve into the social loss function: 
       
     
        
        
     
       
        
       
  
Finally, in order to derive the central bank’s reaction function, we minimize    with 
respect to   .  
Reaction function:    
  
      
   
 






Thus, we can notice that the new equilibrium is characterized by an inflationary bias. 
Importantly, this is a direct outcome of policy makers’ desire to boost the economy 
above its potential level     
     
   , which can be the case of a politically 







Hence, in this simple economic setting, 
each inflation surprise is incorporated 
in inflationary expectations till the 
economy reached the equilibrium point 
E. At that stage, the central bank does 
not have any additional incentive to 
introduce new inflationary surprises 
because of hyperinflation risks.  
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manipulated central bank. At the same time, this inflation bias disappears if the desired 
output is equal with its potential level (  
     
 ) so that the central bank is not so 
assertive about the economic growth. Additionally, higher is the inflation aversion of 
the central bank ( ), lower is the inflation bias, due to a tighter and more counter-
cyclical monetary policy. Obviously, such a policy stance could hardly be agreed by 
politicians and their electorate who are assumed to heavily discount the future by 
putting more emphasis on short-term benefits of economic growth and disregarding its 
long-run inflationary effects. Hence, the central bank’s political independence is one of 
the main building blocks of an economy with no inflation bias, where the monetary 
policy is guided by a clearly specified policy rule with a limited margin of discretion. 
Rogoff (1985) confirmed the importance of inflation aversion of the central bank, 
arguing that an efficient measure for achieving a low and stable inflation is to appoint a 
central banker whose inflation aversion is even stronger than that of the society.  
These theoretical assumptions will be empirically tested in the next sub-chapters which 
will reveal the outcomes of politically motivated monetary policies.  
5.3 Switching the Electoral Cycles to Electoral Inflation 
Usually, a lower inflation aversion and milder counter-cyclical (or even pro-cyclical) 
behavior of some central banks in the proximity of elections, as estimated in the 
previous sub-chapters, can create strong inflationary biases. The main source of this 
increase in inflation around elections comes from pressures exerted by incumbent 
politicians on some central bank officials to engineer more economic growth and, in this 
way, create more jobs and buy votes. As a direct outcome, inflation is, usually, higher in 
the proximity of elections in the countries where the PMC proved to be significant 
(Grier (1989), Klein (1996), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Drazen (2001) and others).  
The hypothesis of higher inflation around elections is confirmed in our sample. Thus, 
we find that in all countries (except Russia) where the political cycles do influence the 
monetary policies, inflation tends to be higher in the proximity of elections and is lower 
in normal times. This statement is revealed by the chart 1, which illustrates that CPI has 
a bigger skew in electoral periods in comparison with non-electoral ones for countries 
where PMC are found to be statistically significant.  
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Chart 1: Skewness (3rd moment) of CPI in Electoral and Non-electoral periods, 
countries with political monetary cycles 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD data 
Thus, we can notice that only in Russia the electoral inflation has a lower skew in 
comparison with the non-electoral one. At the same time, in countries were PMC 
hypothesis has been rejected, the discrepancy between electoral and non-electoral 
inflation skewness is lower. At the same time, there is no clear pattern on the fact that 
inflation tends to be higher in the proximity of elections (chart 2).  
Chart 2: Skewness (3
rd
 moment) of CPI in Electoral and Non-electoral periods, 
countries with no political monetary cycles 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD data 
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5.4 Impact on Central Bank’s Reputation 
The electoral inflation is not the single outcome of politically sensitive monetary 
policies. According to most reputational models, the central bank’s temptation to cheat 
by delivering periodically (in our case this might be around elections) unexpected 
inflation serves as the main source for “inflation bias” emphasized by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and Robert J. Barro and Davis Gordon (1983). Hence, the economic 
agents understand the central bank’s regime switching behavior and its vulnerability to 
political pressures, which translates into a dramatic loss of monetary policy credibility. 
Given the fact that a successful anti-inflationary policy directly depends on central 
bank’s ability to anchor inflationary expectations, its poor reputation translates into a 
strong inflationary bias and central bank’s failure to keep the price level stable. This 
idea corroborates with the findings of Bade and Parkin (1982), Alesina (1988, 1989) 
and Grilli, Maciandaro and Tabellini (1991), that more independent central banks are 
associated with lower levels of inflation. 
The above outlined hypothesis is proven empirically in our sample. The positive 
relation between the degree of political biases in the monetary policy and inflation 
volatility is mostly visible in developing economies. Thus, the chart 3 reveals that 
Turkey, Romania, Moldova and Russia – the countries where the central banks are 
influenced by the electoral cycles – registered the highest standard deviation of 
consumer price index (used as a proxy for inflation volatility).  
Chart 3: Standard deviation of quarterly CPI, in developing economies, period 
2000-2011 
 
  Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD data 
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In the case of advanced economies, the USA and Norway – the countries with political 
monetary cycles – also register relatively high inflation volatility, though are not placed 
in the top. Still, if we eliminate Estonia and Czech Republic, which have quite low 
GDP/capita in comparison with the rest of advanced economic included in the sample, 
USA would be the 1
st
 and Norway the 3
rd
 according to inflation volatility (chart 4).  
Chart 4: Standard deviation of quarterly CPI, in advanced economies, period 
2000-2011 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD data 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Inflation bias is the main outcome of politically sensitive monetary policies. Thus, 
countries with PMC register much higher inflation volatility in comparison with the rest 
of the sample. Moreover, in these countries, except Russia, the inflation around inflation 
tends to be higher than in normal times. This is a direct result of the incumbent 
politicians’ pressures on the monetary authorities to boost employment and aggregate 
demand which is done by engineering some extra-inflation. In conclusion, the central 
banks’ political independence do matter, as it minimizes the inflation bias and, thus, 




Chapter 6: Final Conclusions 
Despite the broad institutional and legislative reformatting of the central banks’ activity 
all other the world aimed at granting the monetary authorities with more independence, 
the issue of political monetary cycles is still a problem for number countries. According 
to our empirical results, the election induced monetary policies are more persistent in 
developing countries, where 4 out of 10 countries from our sample are found to have 
regime switching behavior consistent with the election cycle. These countries are 
Moldova, Romania, Russia and Turkey. At the same time, in 2 out of 10 advanced 
economies, the central banks proved to be politically sensitive: Norway and USA. In all 
these countries, the monetary policy is tilting to the easing side in the proximity of 
elections, which is, most probably, the result of political pressures of incumbent 
government, aimed at boosting the employment in order to gain more votes.  
The main explanatory factors of these electoral monetary policies resume to their poor 
insulation from the fiscal policies, as well as the appointment of the governor or board 
members by the government, active political background of the governor or board 
members, the possibility for the government to conduct the audit of the central bank, 
poorly specified monetary policy objectives and many other factors limiting the central 
banks’ independence. Transparency level, also, plays a crucial role as it improves the 
accountability of central banks and limits the perverse incentives of politicians to tilt the 
monetary policy to their electoral interests.  
Obviously, the electoral induced monetary policies have a series of impacts on the 
economy and society. Thus, in most of countries where the political monetary cycles 
proved to be significant the inflation tends to increase around elections. This is the 
result of incumbent politicians’ pressures on the central banks to promote easier 
monetary policies before elections. In this way, by engineering inflation, which is not 
immediately perceived by voters, the central banks spur the employment and stimulate 
the aggregate demand, creating more favorable macroeconomic conditions for the 
government wishing to get reelected.  
Another well-known outcome of such manipulations with the monetary policies is the 
inflation bias, as revealed by the dynamic inconsistency problem. Thus, in all countries 
were the central banks appear to be influenced by electoral cycles, the inflation 
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volatility is higher in comparison with the other countries from our sample. Given the 
fact that inflation is perceived as an invisible tax and erodes the purchasing power of the 
population, the political monetary cycles imply substantial welfare losses. Additionally, 
more volatile macroeconomic situation fuels the uncertainty along with risk premiums, 
with direct repercussions on investment activity, job creation and overall economic 
development.  
These findings have important implications both for policy and research communities. 
Following the dynamic inconsistency problem we can conclude that the political 
monetary cycles represent a direct outcome of short-run irrationalities of voters who 
heavily discount the future and value the most the immediate benefits obtained from 
higher employment. Consequently, the incumbent politicians explore this short-time 
irrationality of their electorate for immediate gains, while the countercyclical policies 
are left for the post-electoral periods.  
Thus, the importance of designing an adequate legislative framework for minimization 
of these perverse incentives of politicians is imperative. It calls for broad legislative and 
institutional reformation which would ensure the full independence of the central banks, 
especially for countries where political monetary cycles proved to be significant. These 
actions should, at least, lead to a clear stipulation of policy objective, insulation of the 
monetary policy from the fiscal one, elimination of government interventions in the 
monetary policy decisions and increasing the transparency of the central banks’ activity. 
Additionally, the statistical significance of electoral regime switching behavior of some 
central banks, as found by a broad amount of empirical research, including this master 
thesis, should motivate the researchers to enrich the models used for analyzing the 
monetary policies with additional variables controlling for electoral cycles.   
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Annex A: Gretl Script 
#Specify electoral and non-electoral variables 
CPI_E = CPI*E 
CPI_nE = CPI*(1-E) 
CPI_1_E = CPI(-1)*E 
CPI_1_nE = CPI(-1)*(1-E) 
STI_1_E = STI(-1)*E 
STI_1_nE = STI(-1)*(1-E) 
hp_GDP_E = hp_l_GDP*E 
hp_GDP_nE = hp_l_GDP*(1-E) 
hp_GDP_1_E = hp_l_GDP(-1)*E 
hp_GDP_1_nE = hp_l_GDP(-1)*(1-E) 
hp_IPI_E = hp_IPI*E 
hp_IPI_nE = hp_IPI*(1-E) 
 
# OLS 
ols STI const STI_1_E STI_1_nE CPI_E CPI_nE hp_GDP_E hp_GDP_nE 
VCOV_OLS = $vcv 
COEF_OLS = $coeff 
 
#2SLS 
tsls STI const STI_1_E STI_1_nE CPI_E CPI_nE hp_GDP_E hp_GDP_nE; const 
CPI_1_E STI_1_E hp_GDP_1_E hp_IPI_E CPI_1_nE STI_1_nE hp_GDP_1_nE 
hp_IPI_nE  
VCOV_2SLS = $vcv 
COEF_2SLS = $coeff 
 






system name = country_name 
    equation STI const STI_1_E STI_1_nE CPI_E CPI_nE hp_GDP_E hp_GDP_nE 
    equation CPI_E const CPI_1_E STI_1_E 
    equation CPI_nE const CPI_1_nE STI_1_nE 
    equation hp_GDP_E const hp_GDP_1_E hp_IPI_E 
    equation hp_GDP_nE const hp_GDP_1_nE hp_IPI_nE 
    endog STI CPI_E hp_GDP_E CPI_nE hp_GDP_nE 
end system 
 
estimate country_name method=3sls 
 
# Divide coefficient and Vcov matrices for both equations 
VCOV_3SLS = $vcv[1:5,1:5] 









# Testing the equality of regression parameters by imposing restrictions 
restrict 
    b[1,2]-b[1,3]=0  
    b[1,4]-b[1,5]=0 
     
end restrict 
 
# Estimate the model again in order to test whether the restrictions are true 
estimate country_name method=3sls 
 
#Obtain the error terms 
u_E_1 = uhat_s01(-1)*E 
u_nE_1 = uhat_s01(-1)*(1-E) 
 
#Run the 3SLS model with serially correlated error terms 
system name = country_name 
    equation STI const CPI_E CPI_nE hp_GDP_E hp_GDP_nE u_E_1 u_nE_1 
    equation CPI_E const CPI_1_E STI_1_E 
    equation CPI_nE const CPI_1_nE STI_1_nE 
    equation hp_GDP_E const hp_GDP_1_E hp_IPI_E 
    equation hp_GDP_nE const hp_GDP_1_nE hp_IPI_nE 
    endog STI CPI_E hp_GDP_E CPI_nE hp_GDP_nE 
end system 
 
estimate country_name method=3sls 
 
# Testing the equality of regression parameters by imposing restrictions 
restrict 
    b[1,2]-b[1,3]=0  
    b[1,4]-b[1,5]=0 
     
end restrict 
# Estimate the model again in order to test whether the restrictions are true 












Annex B: Gretl Output 
Australia 
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Bulgaria 
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Brazil 
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Canada 
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Czech Republic 
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Denmark 
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Estonia 
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Japan 
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Moldova 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Norway 
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New Zeeland 
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Poland 
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Romania 
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Russia 
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Slovenia 
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Sweden 
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Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Unites States 
 
 
 
 
 
